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ABSTRACT

Wikipedia is a free and open-collaboration based online encyclopedia. The website
has millions of pages that are maintained by thousands of volunteer editors. It is part
of Wikipedia’s fundamental principles that pages are written with a neutral point of
view and are maintained by volunteer editors for free with well-defined guidelines in
order to avoid or disclose any conflict of interest. However, there have been several
known incidents where editors intentionally violate such guidelines in order to get paid
(or even extort money) for maintaining promotional spam articles without disclosing
such information.
This thesis addresses for the first time the problem of identifying undisclosed paid
articles in Wikipedia. We propose a machine learning-based framework that uses a
set of features based on both the content of the articles as well as the patterns of edit
history of users who create them. To test our approach, we collected and curated a
new dataset from English Wikipedia with ground truth on undisclosed paid articles
and a history of users who created those articles. Our experimental evaluation shows
that we can identify undisclosed paid articles with an AUROC of 0.98 and an average
precision of 0.91. Moreover, our approach outperforms ORES, a scoring system tool
currently used by Wikipedia to automatically detect damaging content, in identifying
undisclosed paid articles.
We further propose recurrent neural network-based frameworks, that are variants
of Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), using a set of features based on the patterns
of edit history of users. Our experimental evaluation also shows that we can identify
vi

undisclosed paid editors with an AUROC of 0.93 and an average precision of 0.90
outperforming existing approaches while also outperforming other baseline approaches
in early detecting undisclosed paid editors. Finally, we show that our proposed
approaches can also be used to address other similar tasks achieving the maximum
AUROC score of 0.96, average precision score of 0.97, and accuracy score of 0.90.
Also, in this thesis, we show that our approaches are able to outperform other baseline
approaches in early detecting both Undisclosed Paid Editors and Wikipedia vandal
editors surpassing the performance scores with as little as just two edits.
This thesis is an extension of our work that was published in WWW ’20: The
Web Conference 2020 held in Taipei, Taiwan in April 2020 [13]. Wikipedia have
shown significant interest in our published work and we are currently collaborating
for possible deployment of our system directly into their platform.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Wikipedia is the free online encyclopedia based on the principle of open collaboration;
for the people by the people. Anyone can add and edit almost any article or page.
Voluntary contributors are, however, expected to follow a set of guidelines when
editing Wikipedia. The purpose of Wikipedia is “to provide the public with articles
that summarize accepted knowledge, written neutrally and sourced reliably”

1

and

the encyclopedia should not be considered as a platform for advertising and selfpromotion. Wikipedia’s guidelines strongly discourage any form of conflict-of-interest
(COI) editing and require editors to disclose any COI contribution. Paid editing is a
form of COI editing and refers to editing Wikipedia (in the majority of the cases for
promotional purposes) in exchange for compensation. The guidelines set by Wikipedia
are based on good faith, and malicious editors who earn a living through paid editing
of Wikipedia choose to ignore the requirement to disclose they are paid. Moreover,
these malicious editors often use sockpuppet accounts to circumvent a block or a ban
imposed on the person’s original account. A sockpuppet is an “online identity used
for purposes of deception.”

2

Usually, several sockpuppet accounts are controlled by

a unique individual (or entity) called a puppetmaster.
The first discovered case of paid editing was the “Wiki-PR editing of Wikipedia”,
1
2

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Conflict_of_interest
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sockpuppet_(Internet)

2
in 2013.

3

Wiki-PR is a company, which still exists but is banned by Wikipedia,

whose core business is to offer consulting services to create, edit and monitor “your”
Wikipedia page. The 2013 investigation found out that more than 250 sockpuppet
accounts were related to and controlled by the company. On August 31, 2015, the
Wikipedia community uncovered an even bigger set of 381 sockpuppet accounts,
as part of an investigation nicknamed “Orangemoody” 4 , operating a secret paid
editing ring where participants extorted money from businesses who had articles
about themselves rejected. The Orangemoody accounts themselves may have been
involved in the deletion of some articles.
When undisclosed paid articles or editors are identified, such pages are removed
from Wikipedia, and accounts are blocked. However, the Wikipedia community still
relies on administrators who manually track down editors and affected articles. The
differences between good faith editing and spam can be hard for even experienced
editors to see, and, with hundreds of articles to be examined each month, the review
process can be tedious, inefficient, and possibly unreliable.
In this thesis, we focus, for the first time, on automatically detecting Wikipedia
undisclosed paid contributions and editors, so that they can be quickly identified
and flagged for removal. We make the following contributions. (1) We propose a
machine learning-based framework to classify undisclosed paid articles that uses a
set of features based on both article content, metadata, and network properties, as
well as the patterns of the edit behavior of users who create them. (2) We propose
neural network-based frameworks to classify and detect early undisclosed paid editors
using a set of features based on the patterns of the edit behavior of users. (3) To
3
4

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki-PR_editing_of_Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orangemoody_editing_of_Wikipedia
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test our framework, we built a curated English Wikipedia dataset containing 73.9K
edits by undisclosed paid editors (including deleted edits) and 199.2K edits by genuine
editors, with ground truth on undisclosed paid articles. (4) Through our experimental
evaluation, we show that our proposed machine learning-based method can efficiently
identify undisclosed paid articles with an AUROC of 0.98 and an average precision
of 0.91. We also show that our approach outperforms ORES 5 , the state-of-the-art
machine learning service created and maintained by the Wikimedia Scoring Platform
team to detect content damage on Wikipedia. (5) Through our experimental evaluation, we also show that our proposed neural network-based methods can efficiently
identify undisclosed paid editors with an AUROC of 0.93 and an average precision of
0.90 and easily outperform approaches based on ORES, SAFE [33], and an approach
by Yamak et al. [30]. We also show that our approaches outperform other baseline
approaches in early detecting undisclosed paid editors, exceeding the performance
scores with as little as just two edits. (6) Finally, we demonstrate that our proposed
approaches can also be used to address other similar tasks of detecting vandal users
in Wikipedia achieving the maximum AUROC score of 0.96, average precision score
of 0.97, and accuracy score of 0.90 using the UMDWikipedia [16] dataset curated for
the purpose of detecting Wikipedia vandal editors. We show that our approaches
are able to outperform other baseline approaches in early detecting Wikipedia vandal
editors.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses related work associated
with our thesis work. Chapter 3 describes the dataset, provided by Wikipedia, used
in our research work. Chapter 4 describes our approach and reports experimental
results and baseline comparison for detection of undisclosed paid articles. Chapter 5
5

https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/ORES

4
describes our approaches and reports experimental results and baseline comparison
for early detection of undisclosed paid editors. Chapter 5 also reports experimental
results and baseline comparison when we use our approaches in similar tasks of
detecting Wikipedia vandal editors. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Chapter 6.
Appendix A provides instruction to repeat and rerun our experiments for the purpose
of reproducibility.

5

CHAPTER 2

RELATED WORK

Past literature has studied different forms of content damage on Wikipedia, including
vandalism, hoaxes, and spam. Wikipedia vandalism is “the act of editing the project
in a malicious manner that is intentionally disruptive”, e.g., through text that is
humorous, nonsensical, or offensive.

1

Detecting vandalism was the first problem

studied in the context of Wikipedia content deception. Research shows that linguistic,
metadata, and user reputation features are all important to detect vandal edits in
Wikipedia [20, 29, 2, 1]. Kumar et al. [16] proposed Vandal Early Warning System
(VEWS) to address the problem of early detecting vandal users by leveraging editor’s
behavioral patterns. The literature showed that, on average, VEWS is able to detect
vandal users 2.39 edits before ClueBot NG, a state-of-the-art vandal detection tool.
VEWS, with its accuracy score of over 0.87 also outperforms less than 0.60 accuracy
scores from STiki, another state-of-the-art vandal detection tool.
Kumar et al. [18] studied the characteristics and impact of Wikipedia hoaxes, articles that deceptively present false information as fact. They showed that Wikipedia
hoaxes can be detected using features that consider the article structure and content,
hyperlink network properties, and the hoaxes’ creator reputation. Utilizing such
features, Kumar et al. [18] achieved the AUROC score of 0.98 in detecting hoaxes
1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vandalism_on_Wikipedia
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compared to the AUROC score of just 0.63 with human-based approaches of detecting
hoaxes without any specialized tools.
Spam, which is another form of content damage on Wikipedia, refers to the
unsolicited promotion of some entities such as external link spamming and advertisements masquerading as articles (as the promotional articles written by undisclosed paid editors). The majority of the work on spam detection on Wikipedia
has focused on detecting link spamming via metadata, URL properties, landing site
characteristics [28, 27], or spam users using behavioral-based features [8]. Green and
Spezzano achieved an AUROC score of 0.842 in detecting Wikipedia spam users using
behavior-based features. To the best of our knowledge, there is no work addressing
the problem of detecting promotional Wikipedia articles or undisclosed paid edits.
Several bots and tools run on Wikipedia to detect vandalism or general damaging
edits. ClueBot NG

2

and STiki

3

[29] are designed to detect vandalism. ClueBot NG

is a bot that analyzes edit content, scores edits and reverts the worst-scoring edits.
STiki is an intelligent routing tool that suggests potential vandalism to humans for
definitive classification. It uses metadata and reverts to score edits and computes a
reputation score for each user. Currently, Wikimedia ORES5 is the state-of-the-art
approach to classify the quality of Wikipedia articles. Specifically, given an article,
ORES evaluates the content of the article according to one of the following classes:
spam, vandalism, attack, or OK. Thus, we will compare our proposed approaches to
detect undisclosed paid articles with ORES in our thesis work.
As explained in Chapter 1, undisclosed paid editors typically act as a group of
sockpuppet accounts. Several literary works have analyzed and detected sockpuppet
2
3

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:ClueBot_NG
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:STiki
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accounts in online social networks and discussion forums [26, 4, 19, 15]. Specific to
Wikipedia, Solorio et al. [21, 22] have addressed the problem of detecting whether or
not two accounts are maintained by the same user using text authorship identification
features. In detecting sockpuppets in Wikipedia, Solorio et al. [22] were able to
achieve an accuracy score of 0.68 outperforming baseline systems performance with an
accuracy score of 0.53 from a trivial classifier that predicts every case as a sockpuppet
(majority) and the accuracy score of just 0.50 from a random baseline (coin toss).
Other approaches have focused on classifying sockpuppet vs. genuine accounts by
using non-verbal behavior and considering editing patterns [25, 30]. Tsikerdekis and
Zeadally [25] were able to achieve an overall accuracy of 0.71 in identifying sockpuppet
accounts using non-verbal user activity. Yamak et al. [30] showed that their approach
based on the contribution behavior of the users achieves better performances than
other works based on the analysis of the contribution text [21, 22] or using non-verbal
behavior [25]. Yamak et al. [30] was able to achieve the best overall accuracy score
of 0.998 using Random Forest algorithm as compared to the accuracy score of 0.713
using the Non-verbal expectancy Violations Detection approach from Tsikerdekis and
Zeadally [25], 0.730 using Adaptive SVM Text Attribute Disagreement Algorithm
approach from Solorio et al. [21], and 0.688 from the Natural Language Processing
Similarity Searching approach from Solorio et al. [22].
Beyond a multitude of classic machine learning approaches, researchers have also
used deep learning architectures in the detection of malicious users. Zheng et al. [34]
used Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), an artificial Recurrent Neural Network
architecture, to address the problem of class imbalance in datasets when detecting
fraud in online social networks. The literature utilizes LSTM to learn benign user
representation in hidden space from user’s edit sequences and uses complimentary

8
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) model to train and generate complimentary
user representation in hidden space. Through its results, Zheng et al. [34] showed that
it performs better than nearest neighbor based approach such as the One-class nearest
neighbors (OCNN) [23], Gaussian-based approach such as the One-class Gaussian
process (OCGP) [14], and classical classifier-based approach such as the One-class
SVM (OCSVM) [24]. This work by Zheng et al. [34] shows the applicability of
LSTM in learning user’s edit sequences in hidden space and predicting vandal users.
Zheng et al. [33] addressed the problem of consistent detection of fraudsters in time,
i.e., early detection, by incorporating a survival analysis approach with a recurrent
neural network (RNN). The literature utilizes user-activity sequences through an
RNN and its output at each timestamp to determine the survival probability that is
used to make predictions at that timestamp. Through its results, SAFE [33] showed
that it performs better than classical classifiers such as Support Vector Machine
(SVM), a typical survival model such as the Cox proportional hazard (CPH) model
by Cox D. R. [5], and Multi-source LSTM (M-LSTM) by Yuan et al. [31] which
is a classification-based fraud early detection model that uses LSTM to capture
time-dependent covariates.
While automated and efficient detection of undisclosed paid contributions is paramount
in maintaining consumers’ faith on Wikipedia as a trusted source of information, it
can also result in unintended consequences of unpaid good-faith contributions flagged
as undisclosed paid contributions. Halfaker et al. [9] studied the impact of algorithmic
tools, utilized by Wikipedia to automatically reject contributions, on retention of new
contributors. The study found that automated reversion of contributions by desirable
new users reverts amplify the negative effect of rejection on survival, thus driving
away genuine contributors threatening the functional existence of open collaboration

9
systems in general. Likewise, false positives when detecting undisclosed paid contribution to Wikipedia by flagging genuine good-faith contributions as undisclosed
paid contribution can have similar negative effects in retaining genuine contributors.
Therefore, apart from the focus on efficiency and effectiveness, the minimization of
false-positive detection is also one of the major challenges.

10

CHAPTER 3

DATASET

This chapter describes the dataset we used to perform this study. We collaborated
with an English Wikipedia administrator 1 active in reviewing articles that may have
a conflict of interest (especially paid editing) to collect and curate a dataset of newly
created positive articles, created by known undisclosed paid editors, and newly created
negative articles, created by genuine users who are not paid editors. We collected the
data through the publicly available Wikipedia API. We were able to access currently
deleted edits from known undisclosed paid editors, thanks to our administrator’s
account. Deleted edits are not visible to general users through the Wikipedia API.
To gather the set of positive articles, we started by considering a manually curated
set of 1,006 known undisclosed paid editor (UPE) accounts from English Wikipedia,
which includes accounts from 23 different sockpuppet investigations [3]. Another
set of 98 additional known UPE accounts were manually added by our Wikipedia
administrator, resulting in a total of 1,104 UPE accounts. Among the set of new
articles created by these UPE accounts, our administrator manually classified 748 of
these articles (authored by 330 different editors) as paid articles (positive data).

2

To collect the set of negative articles, we started by retrieving accounts of users
who created a new article (or moved pages created in their user page or draft page
1

Smart SE, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User%3ASmartse
Not all the articles created by a UPE are paid articles as these editors may create “genuine”
articles to build a reputation.
2
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Table 3.1: Size of Positive and Negative Data. Positive data refers to newly created
paid articles or known undisclosed paid editors (UPEs).
Positive Data Negative Data
Newly Created Articles
748
6,984
Editors
1,104 (UPEs)
1,557
Total Num. of Edits
73,931
199,172

to the article namespace as some UPEs do) in March 2019 (time of data collection)
and who, similarly to UPEs, had made relatively few edits (less than 200 edits) in
their account lifetime. 1,557 of these users resulted in being genuine, i.e., they are not
known paid editors (or even Wikipedia blocked users 3 ), or potentially paid editors as
manually verified by our Wikipedia administrator. Then, we considered as the set of
negative articles, all the newly created articles by these genuine users. This resulted
in 6,984 articles.
For each article in the positive and negative sets, we built a dataset containing
the username of the user who created the page, the creation timestamp, the content
of the article corresponding to the last edit by the article creator, and computed its
size (in bytes). Further, in order to be able to compute features about the article
creator account, we collected the time when the account was created and the whole
edit history of all the genuine and UPE accounts collected as explained above. For
each of these edits (or revisions), we collected timestamp, edited page title, revision
ID, revision size, and size difference with respect to the previous version of the edited
page. As explained above, deleted edits by UPEs are included in this data, providing
us with a complete edit history for the UPE accounts. In total, we collected 73,931
edits by our 1,104 UPEs and 199,172 edits by our 1,557 genuine editors. Table 3.1
summarizes the size of the collected data. Figure 3.2 summarizes the data collection
3

List of all Wikipedia blocked users: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BlockList
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process.

Figure 3.2: Data collection process

3.1

Article Network Analysis

We built an article-article network where Wikipedia articles are nodes, and there
is an edge between two articles if the same user has edited them. We considered
the edit history of all the users in our dataset for creating this network. Figure 3.1
shows the resulting network (93,406 nodes and 44,264,072 edges) where colored nodes
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represent articles where at least one undisclosed paid editor contributed (referred as
positive articles in the rest of this section), and gray ones indicate articles edited only
by benign users (referred as negative articles in the rest of this section). Two positive
nodes have the same color if the same sockpuppet group has created them. We
used the list of sockpuppet investigations in the context of undisclosed paid editing
provided by Ballioni et al. [3].
Statistical analysis of datasets gave us some insights into the network structures
and shapes of node concentrations based on sockpuppet investigations. We evaluated
the total number of unique articles edited by unique users in each socksuppet investigation and used standard deviation to measure the amount of variation of unique
article edits in each one of the investigations. Figure 3.3 shows standard deviations
of unique article edits per user in each sockpuppet investigations. We found out that
the investigations with higher standard deviation of unique articles edits counts per
user tend to form connected network shapes with larger nodes concentration. For
example, the LogAntiLog investigation has the highest standard deviation among all
the investigations and its ”drop” shape has the largest nodes concentration. For the
investigations with standard deviations in intermediate range, connected networks of
investigations tend to form ”bracket” shapes with sparse node concentrations with
small concentration of nodes. For example, Singer Jethu Sisodiya/Rudra.shukla and
Ventus55/Anatha Gulati investigation pairs with similar standard deviation values
form near identical shapes. As we move from highest to lowest standard deviations
of unique article edits per user, connected networks lose concrete form of nodes
concentration.
By studying the network, we found that positive articles are less central in the
network than negative ones. On average, positive articles have a PageRank of 1.15e-05
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(vs. 1.17e-05 for negative ones) and an average local clustering coefficient (LCC) of
0.966 (vs. 0.974 in the case of negative articles). In both cases, the means are different
with a p-value ¡ 0.001 according to an independent t-test. This means that there is
less user collaboration among positive articles. UPEs only work on a limited number
of Wikipedia titles that they are interested in promoting, whereas genuine users edit
more pages related to their field of expertise. That results in negative pages being
more tightly knit in the network. This result also shows that sockpuppets accounts’
behavior in Wikipedia is different from sockpuppetry in online discussion communities
where sockpuppets’ main goal is to interact with each other to deceive other users,
and they have higher PageRank and LCC than benign users [15].
By looking at the articles edited by the same sockpuppet group in Figure 3.1,
we observe that, for some investigations, the corresponding pages are more clustered
than others. To further understand the meaning of different cluster shapes, for each
investigation, we computed the number of unique articles edited by each sockpuppet
account and used the standard deviation (SD) to measure the amount of variation of
unique edited articles per account in each one of the investigations. Figure 3.3 shows
the SD values for each investigation. We found out that the investigations with higher
standard deviation tend to form denser clusters with a “drop” shape. This is the case,
for instance, of the LogAntiLog investigation that has the highest standard deviation
of 697 among all the investigations with fewer sockpuppet accounts contributing to
most of the articles. For investigations with standard deviations in the intermediate
range, corresponding clusters tend to form “bracket” shapes as UPEs’ contributions
are more distributed among affected articles. For example, Singer Jethu Sisodiya
(SD=405)/Rudra.shukla (SD=397) and Ventus55 (SD=49)/Anatha Gulati (SD=70)
investigation pairs have similar standard deviation values and form near-identical
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shapes. As we move to investigations with a lower standard deviation of unique edited
articles per account, clusters start to lose shape (e.g., Orangemoody investigation with
SD=12). This analysis suggests that different undisclosed paid editor groups may
adopt different editing strategies, which makes the problem of detecting undisclosed
paid articles more challenging.
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Figure 3.1: Article network: two articles are connected by an edge if they have been
edited by a common user. Colors indicate articles create by the same sockpuppet
group of undisclosed paid editors (UPEs). Negative articles (in gray) are articles
never edited by an UPE.

17

Figure 3.3: Standard deviation of unique edited articles per user per sockpuppet
investigation.
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CHAPTER 4

DETECTING UNDISCLOSED PAID ARTICLES

In this chapter, we address the problem of identifying undisclosed paid articles in
English Wikipedia as a binary classification task. This chapter is organized as follows.
Section 4.1 introduces our features to be used with our framework. Section 4.2
discuses experimental setup, results, and baseline comparisons.

4.1

Features for Identifying Undisclosed Paid Articles

In this section, we discuss two sets of features used with our framework based on the
properties of articles as well as the edit history of users who created such articles.
The features we chose are based on the patterns or behaviors that are more likely
to be associated with malicious behavior and paid editing to distinguish them from
a benign one. The list of features considered in our approach is described in the
following two subsections.

4.1.1

Article-based Features

This first set of features we discuss includes features related to the article, such
as metadata, content, and network-based features: Age of user account at article
creation (user age) - Since sockpuppet accounts are more likely to be created at the
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time of the creation of an article, the age of user account at the time of article creation
can be considered as one of the features in detecting undisclosed paid articles.
Infobox - This feature checks if the article contains the infobox. The infobox is “a
fixed-format table usually added to the top right-hand corner of articles to consistently
present a summary of some unifying aspect that the articles share and some time to
improve navigation to other interrelated articles.”

1

Undisclosed paid editors tend to

add the infobox to the pages they create to increase the exposure of the entity they
are promoting as the presence of an infobox is an easy way for humans to grasp a
summary of article content.
Number of references - This feature indicates the total number of references
(including URL links) present in a given Wikipedia article. Regular Wikipedia articles
(especially newly created ones) have a lot of missing references, and researchers have
been addressing the problem of suggesting proper references [12]. On the other hand,
the purpose of creating undisclosed paid articles is promotional, hence several explicit
references to the promoted item are added at the time of page creation. Therefore, a
higher number of references in a given article can be a useful indicator of undisclosed
paid editing.
Number of photos - This feature refers to the number of photos present in a
given Wikipedia article. Uploading images on Wikipedia is relatively complicated
as it requires copyright verification. The majority of images added to Wikipedia
articles are removed within hours or days of being uploaded because of inappropriate,
insufficient, or inaccurate copyright information. Then, to avoid that a promotional
article looks suspicious because of its associated images, undisclosed paid articles tend
to have fewer images than regular articles.
1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Infobox
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Number of categories - This feature represents the number of categories associated
with a given article. Articles that belong to many categories deal with more complex
topics and are less likely to be undisclosed paid articles.
Content length - This feature indicates the total length, in bytes, of the content
of the given Wikipedia page. As regular pages are more curated and edited collaboratively by many editors, they tend to have more content and longer in size than
undisclosed paid ones.
Network-based features - We also consider the article PageRank and Local Clustering Coefficient (LCC) as additional features for the article (cf. Section 3.1).

4.1.2

User-based Features

The second group of features we discuss refer to characteristics, such as choice of
username and editing behavior, of the user account that created the article. All the
features but the username-based ones are computed by considering the history of
contributions made by the editor.
Characteristics of usernames can be linked to malicious users that could create
undisclosed paid articles [32]. For instance, Green and Spezzano [8] showed that
username-based features are important to detect Wikipedia spammers. Thus, we
consider the number of leading digits, the number of digits, the ratio of digits to
characters, and the ratio of unique characters in a username as features indicating a
suspicious account.
Average size of added text (avg size added) - Given an editor, this feature computes
the average size of text added to an article by the editor. Undisclosed paid editors
are more likely to create new article content offline and then add it to Wikipedia at
once, while benign users edit Wikipedia directly with smaller additions over time.
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Average time difference (avg time diff ) - This feature indicates the average time
between two consecutive edits made by the same user. As explained in the above
feature, undisclosed paid editors do not regularly edit Wikipedia. They work mainly
offline and then add the content whenever they are ready. Thus, we expect the average
time difference to be higher for these malicious editors than benign editors.
Ten-byte ratio - This feature computes the percentage of edits made by a user
that are less than 10 bytes. Undisclosed paid editors try to become autoconfirmed
users; thus, they typically make around ten minor edits before creating a promotional
article. A registered user account becomes automatically autoconfirmed if the account
is more than four days old and has made at least ten changes. Autoconfirmed users
are considered benign users that are therefore allowed to move pages to a different title
and make changes to pages that have been semi-protected by administrators. The
main reason for having autoconfirmed status on Wikipedia is to prevent vandalism
and other types of disruptive editing.

2

Percentage of edits on User or Talk pages (user talk edits) - This feature computes
the percentage of edits a user has done on a User or Talk page. Undisclosed paid
editors may want to edit User or Talk pages for several reasons: they want to have a
User page to look like genuine editors; they may draft some content on the article Talk
page before moving it to the main article page. Further, the content of an article is
discussed by Wikipedia editors on the article Talk page or the contributor’s User page.
As the contribution of undisclosed paid editors may be disputed by administrators
and genuine editors, we expect these malicious editors to engage more in editing these
types of pages than genuine editors.

2

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:User_access_levels
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4.2

Experimental Results

We tested our features for the classification task by using three different classification
algorithms, namely Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Random Forest. We used class weighting to deal with class imbalance in all the classifiers.
Class weighting is a way to learn from an unbalanced dataset where the classification
imposes, during training, a penalty proportionally inverse to the class distribution
on the model for making classification mistakes. To evaluate the performances, we
considered the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve (AUROC)
and the Average Precision metrics, which are well-suited to measure classification
results in case of unbalanced data, and performed stratified 5-fold cross-validation.
We were able to achieve the best performance with Random Forest with an
AUROC of 0.856 and an average precision of 0.507 using features based on article
content, as shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Performance of our proposed features to detect undisclosed paid articles
according to different classification algorithms (best scores highlighted in bold) and
comparison and combinations with ORES features (which are article-based) according
to AUROC and average precision metrics.
Article-based Features

User-based Features

Article + User Features

AUROC

Average Precision

AUROC

Average Precision

AUROC

Average Precision

Random Forest

0.856

0.507

0.971

0.893

0.983

0.913

Our Features

Logistic Regression

0.734

0.230

0.675

0.171

0.656

0.153

Support Vector Machine (SVM)

0.555

0.171

0.980

0.823

0.556

0.172

ORES (Random Forest)

0.844

0.424

-

-

-

-

Our Features + ORES (Random Forest)

0.905

0.597

0.974

0.877

0.981

0.907

Figure 4.1 shows the importance of content features in detecting undisclosed paid
articles.
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Figure 4.1: Top-10 most important features for detecting undisclosed paid articles.

4.2.1

Feature analysis

To analyze our features, we computed feature importance via a forest of randomized
trees. Let F be a set of features. The relative importance (for the classification
task) of a feature f ∈ F is given by the depth of f when it is used as a decision
node in a tree. Features used at the top of the tree contribute to the final prediction
decision of a larger fraction of the input samples. The expected fraction of the samples
they contribute to can thus be used as an estimate of the relative importance of the
features. Figure 4.1 shows the importance of our set of features for the undisclosed
paid articles classification task. The red bars in the plot show the feature importance
using the whole forest. The variability of feature importance scores across the trees
in the forest is minimal (less than 0.0001).
Among all the features we defined (article and user-based), the top four most
important features are: percentage of edits on User or Talk pages, average time
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difference, number of references, and ten-byte ratio. We observe that, on average, the
value of the percentage of edits on User or Talk pages feature is higher for positive
articles (0.008) than for negative ones (0.0007). These values confirm our hypothesis
that users who create undisclosed paid articles are more engaged in editing User and
Talk pages than genuine users. Further, we see that, on average, users who create
undisclosed paid articles edit more slowly than genuine users: the value of the average
time difference feature is 2.8 days for regular articles and 9.2 days for undisclosed paid
articles. Also, the percentage of edits that are less than 10 bytes in size is higher for
users who created undisclosed paid articles: the value of the ten-byte ratio feature is,
on average, 0.38 for positive articles and 0.34 for negative ones. This pattern aligns
with the typical behavior of UPEs who make around ten minor edits, then remain
quiet for a few days waiting for becoming autoconfirmed users (the process takes four
days), and then create a promotional article followed by the account going silent [3].
The third most important feature is the number of references in the newly created
article. We observe that, on average, positive articles have more references than
negative ones: 7.06 vs. 4.88. As explained in Section 4.1.1, this aligns with the fact
that regular Wikipedia articles have more missing references than undisclosed paid
ones that instead use references to the promoted item.

4.2.2

Comparison with ORES

To compare our preliminary work with ORES, we retrieved the draft quality scores
for the positive and negative articles in our dataset by using the ORES publicly
available API

3

and used them in input to a classifier to predict undisclosed paid

articles. Our preliminary work shows that our approach outperformed ORES, which
3

https://ores.wikimedia.org
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Table 4.2: Class averages of each feature.
Feature

Positive Average

Negative Average

user age

0.439 (days)

0.467 (days)

num categories

2.06

2.154

infobox

0.57

0.479

num references

7.064

4.881

num photos

0.416

0.95

content length

4455.876

6184.849

user talk edits

0.008

0.0007

avgtime diffs

9.2 (days)

2.8 (days)

num digits

0.475

0.917

digits to chars

0.061

0.173

leading digits

0.021

0.02

unique char ratio

0.815

0.834

ten byte ratio

0.38

0.34

avg size added

1093.85

1080.372

PageRank

1.15e-05

1.17e-05

LCC

0.966

0.974

achieved an AUROC of 0.844 and average precision of 0.424 in detecting undisclosed
paid articles. We further observed that our approach, when combined with ORES
features, significantly improved both AUROC (0.905) and average precision (0.597).
Table 4.1 shows experimental results from our preliminary work.

4.2.3

Robustness of Model

One of the areas of concern in using a select set of features in detecting undisclosed
paid articles is the possibility of such users evading some features and degrading the
performance of our model and its ability to detect undisclosed paid articles. We
analyzed the stalwart performance of our model, in case the user tries to evade some
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features, by understanding the robustness of our model. For that, we used a forest
of random trees along with feature ablation (removing one of the 16 features at a
time and performing the classification with the remaining 15 features). When we
exclude our top-1 feature, we notice the largest decrement of the performance of our
model. However, even with such drop, our model still achieves an AUROC of 0.962
and Average Precision of 0.834. Table 4.3 shows the performance of our model when
we remove one of the 16 features at a time and perform the classification with the
remaining 15 features.

Table 4.3: Analysis of model robustness in detecting undisclosed paid articles.
Excluded Feature

AUROC

Average Precision

user talk edits

0.962

0.834

num references

0.974

0.895

ten byte ratio

0.975

0.877

avg size added

0.975

0.897

avgtime diffs

0.976

0.881

PageRank

0.980

0.902

unique char ratio

0.980

0.905

num photos

0.980

0.908

num digits

0.980

0.905

content length

0.981

0.908

leading digits

0.982

0.911

num categories

0.982

0.910

digits to chars

0.982

0.914

infobox

0.982

0.906

user age

0.983

0.914

LCC

0.984

0.915
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4.2.4

False Positives Analysis

Another area of concern when predicting UPEs is the false prediction of genuine
unpaid article edits as UPEs. We investigated such false positives from our proposed
approach by understanding each feature’s contribution to the resulting false positives
and feature values when there is a false positive prediction. To investigate the contribution of a feature towards false positive predictions, we performed feature ablation
by removing one of the 16 features at a time and performing the classification with the
remaining 15 features. By performing feature ablation and subsequent classification,
we can identify which feature contributes to the least false positives when excluded
from model training and classification. From a multitude of experimental runs, we
computed the average of false-positive counts summed up over each stratified sampling
fold. We found out that digits to chars feature contributes most towards the false
positives in identifying UPEs as false positives count when this feature is excluded is
the least. Also, user talk edits contributes least in false-positive predictions of UPEs
as excluding this feature results in the highest number of false-positives. Figure 4.2
shows contribution of each feature towards false-positive prediction of UPEs.
False-positive counts showed us the extent to which each feature contributed to
false positives. However, we can also understand the conditions that led to such
false positive predictions by investigating feature values and its proximity to class
averages. To investigate feature values associated with false-positive predictions, we
compared feature values of each sample that resulted in false-positive predictions
against positive and negative average feature values and computed the counts of
cases when feature value from test sample was closer to positive average feature value
from train data than the negative average feature value from the train data. With
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Figure 4.2: False positive contribution averaged over 10 experimental runs.

this determination, we can understand the relation between feature and its value
that results with false-positive predictions when test feature values associated with
negative ground truth value are closer to average feature value of positive train data.
In doing so, we found out that with the false positive predictions, avgtime diff and
digits to chars had its feature values closer to the average of positive train data than
the average of negative train data. We also notice that the user talk edits feature had
test values that are mostly closer to negative average train feature values. Figure4.3
shows how often each feature value was closer to positive train average when the
model made false-positive predictions.
Based on our false-positive analysis, we can remove our top false-positive con-
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Figure 4.3: False positive contribution averaged over 10 experimental runs.
tributing feature, i.e., digits to chars, to reduce false positives from our proposed
approach while still maintaining robust performance with 0.982 AUROC and 0.914
average precision as shown in Table 4.3.
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CHAPTER 5

EARLY DETECTION OF UNDISCLOSED PAID EDITORS

In this chapter, we address the problem of early detecting undisclosed paid editors
in English Wikipedia as a binary classification task using edit history data of the
users. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 introduces our proposed
methodology.

Section

5.2 discusses user-based features we utilize for the early

detection task of undisclosed paid editors. Section 5.3 discuses experimental setup,
results, and baseline comparisons. Additionally, Section 5.3.1 discusses results and
baseline comparisons using a different dataset used to address the similar task of
detecting Wikipedia vandal editors.

5.1

Methodology

In order to achieve our objective of classifying user edit history data and detect
Undisclosed Paid Editors, we used Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), which is a
special kind of Recurrent Neural Network capable of learning long-term temporal
dependencies, to study the dependability of temporal sequence of user’s edit behavior.
We made the following considerations in deciding architecture selection:
• The problem of detecting Undisclosed Paid Editors constitute task of classification of user edit history data that are time-series sequence data
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• To predict user sequence at any given time-step, we need to learn from its
behavior or action from previous time-steps, i.e., accessibility of feedback from
previous time-steps at each time-step
• Ability to relay constant flow of feedback without it vanishing or exploding for
the long sequences
Even though LSTM itself is a form of Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), unlike RNN,
LSTM incorporates input, forget, and output gates (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber [10])
that effectively resolves the issue of vanishing or exploding gradient. Utilizing these
gates, LSTM can maintain hidden states of previous time-steps that allows for a
constant flow of feedback in sequential data (Gehring et al. [6]). With this, LSTM
can decide to remember or forget the feedback in recurrent layers and allow for the
learning of long-term dependencies in sequential data (Huang et al. [11]) and thus
are more useful in sequence classification. As the user edit history data is a time-series
sequence data, LSTM once again makes a better approach for the task of detecting
undisclosed paid editors.
With LSTM selected as our preferred architecture for our approach, we now
present a general overview of Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) which forms the
basis of our proposed methods. The rest of this section then describes our proposed
methods for early detection of Undisclosed Paid Editors.

5.1.1

LSTM: Overview

An LSTM consists of a repeating module of a basic unit called an LSTM cell. Each
LSTM cell consists of three gates, namely input, forget, and output gates, to decide
retention of memory from previous cell, details to be discarded in current cell, and
output of current cell respectively. In each LSTM cell, ht−1 is the output of the last
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Figure 5.1: Visual representation of a single LSTM cell
LSTM unit, ct−1 is the memory from the last LSTM unit, xt is the current input, ct
is the new updated memory, and ht is the current output. Input gate uses ht−1 and
xt to decide which values from current input should pass through and gives weight to
those inputs passing through. Forget gate discards the memory to be discarded and
updates current memory ct . And finally, output gate uses updated memory ct and
input xt and decides new output ht . Hence, at any given step, inputs to the LSTM
cell are xt , ht−1 and ct−1 and outputs from the LSTM cell are ht and ct . Figure
5.1 shows components of individual LSTM cells and Figure 5.2 shows three gates of
LSTM.

5.1.2

LSTM: Loss function

A model’s performance is evaluated by considering how close its predicted values
are from the ground truth. Difference between predictions from actual results, which
signifies extent by which predicted values deviate from ground truth, is measured as a
loss value and function that computes this loss value is called loss function. An LSTM
optimizer works by minimizing this loss value in order to improve its performance.
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Figure 5.2: LSTM gates
For classification problems, cross entropy loss function is used which is determined as
the product of the log of the actual predicted probability for the ground truth class
at each time instance as shown in the equation 5.1.

loss = −(yt log(ybt ) + (1 − yt )log(1 − ybt ))

(5.1)

where,
yt = actual results or ground truth
ybt = probability of predicted class

Out of two factors used to compute loss, ground truth is fixed. However, we use
ybt (probability of predicted class) to define any variations to loss function as required.
ybt at time-step t (t ∈ (1, .., `(u)) is computed using weight vector of dense LSTM
layer w and hidden layer activation output ht as:
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ybt = W T .ht

(5.2)

where,
W T = weight matrix
ht = activation (hidden layer) output at time-step t
t = 1, .., `(u), i.e. length of edit sequence of user u

5.1.3

LSTM: Loss function for user edit sequence

For a given user u with edit sequence activity from time-step 1 to t, cross entropy
loss function for edit sequence is given by:

loss = CE(W T .ht )

(5.3)

where,
W T = weight matrix
ht = activation (hidden layer) output at time-step t
t = 1, .., `(u)
`(u) = length of edit sequence of user u
u ∈ user in set of users U
And, cross entropy loss function for edit sequences of entire user set, therefore, is
given by taking the sum of cross entropy of all users as shown below:

loss =

X
uU

where,
u ∈ user in set of users U

CE(W T .ht )

(5.4)
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W T = weight matrix
ht = activation (hidden layer) output at time-step t
t = 1, .., `(u), i.e. length of edit sequence of user u
In sections 5.1.4 and 5.1.5, we propose variations of LSTM model architecture
based on the way we consider hidden layer outputs for cross entropy loss determinations.

5.1.4

LSTM1: Using hidden layer output from last layer

In our first approach, we use the LSTM1 model, an LSTM model architecture with
a many-to-one setup, as shown in the Figure 5.3 where we only use the last hidden
layer output at the end of the sequence. In this approach, we use class-specific
weighting to deal with class imbalance. The detailed architecture of our LSTM1 model
implementation is shown in Figure 5.4. This approach allows the model to consider
the entire sequence before classifying a sequence. With such model architecture, our
standard cross entropy loss function takes the form as shown in the equation 5.5:

loss =

X

CE(W T .hL )

(5.5)

uU

where,
u ∈ user in set of users U
L = length of edit sequence of user u

5.1.5

LSTM2: Using all hidden layer outputs

In our second approach, we use an LSTM model architecture with a many-to-many
setup, as shown in figure 5.5, where we use hidden layer output at each time-step

36

Figure 5.3: LSTM1 overview

of sequences resulting in hidden layer output sequence with the same length as that
of the input sequence. The final prediction for the given sequence considers hidden
layer output at each and every time-step. In this approach, once again, we use
class-specific weighting to deal with class imbalance. However, in LSTM2, we use
varying weights for different h-output from different LSTM cells. Such weights vary
from highest to lowest as we move from first h-output towards final h-output in
sequence. The detailed architecture of our LSTM2 model implementation is shown
in Figure 5.6. This approach allows the model to consider the hidden layer outputs
at each time-step before classifying a sequence. With such model architecture, our
standard cross entropy loss function takes the form as shown in the equation 5.6:

loss =

X `(u)
X
uU t=1

where,
u ∈ user in set of users U
t = sequence length (1, .., `(u))
`(u) = length of edit sequence of user u

CE(WtT .ht )

(5.6)
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Figure 5.4: Visualization of LSTM1 model architecture
Figures 5.4 and 5.6 show the detailed architectures of LSTM1 and LSTM2 respectively.

5.2

Features for Identifying Undisclosed Paid Editors

With the details of our proposed modeling approaches discussed, we now describe
the group of features we use with our models. As we have seen in the previous
chapter, the user-based features described in Section 4.1.2 are better than contentbased ones in detecting undisclosed paid articles. Thus, in this section, we investigate
the effectiveness of these features on the different but related task of early-detection of
undisclosed paid editors. The group of features we use to early-detect undisclosed paid
editors are similar to the ones we discussed in Section 4.1.2. However, we compute
some of the features in different ways that are more compatible with our approach in
early-detecting undisclosed paid editors. Each revision in user edit history represents
an action or event, and the user’s overall edit history represents a sequence of such
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Figure 5.5: LSTM2 overview
actions. As we want our models to learn from each successive action for the task of
early-detecting undisclosed paid editors, feature values from each one of users’ actions
are used without any aggregation.
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, once again, we consider the number of leading
digits, the number of digits, the ratio of digits to characters, and the ratio of unique
characters in username as features indicating a suspicious account.
Size difference (sizediff ) - Given an editor, this feature computes the size of any
modification or update corresponding to a given revision to an article by the editor.
This is the difference between the size of an article before and after the revision is
made.
Time difference (time diff ) - This feature indicates the time between two consecutive edits made by the same user.
Under ten bytes - This feature is similar to Ten-byte ratio feature described in
Section 4.1.2. However, here we consider this as a binary feature indicating whether
an edit made by a user is less than 10 bytes or not.
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Figure 5.6: Visualization of LSTM2 model architecture
Edits on User or Talk pages (edited) - This feature is similar to Percentage of
edits on User or Talk pages feature described in Section 4.1.2. However, for the
task of early detecting undisclosed paid editors, we consider this as a binary feature
indicating whether an edit made by a user is on User/Talk page or an article.

5.3

Experimental Results

In this section, we look at experimental results for our neural-network-based approaches discussed in Section 5.1. For this, we utilize features described in Section 5.2
and consider only up to the first 20 user-edits from our dataset. In our experiments,
both LSTM variants consist of a single LSTM layer with an output space dimension
of 16. As our objective is to catch undisclosed paid editors close to the beginning of
their action sequence, we consider only up to the first 20 user-edits in our dataset,
LSTM cell count, or time-step in both our models are 20 each. As LSTM1 uses hidden
outputs from hidden layer output only at the end of the sequence, its output shape is
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a single hidden output sequence of length that is equal to the output dimension of the
LSTM layer. However, LSTM2 uses hidden outputs at each time-step and therefore
has LSTM layer output with a shape of (20, 16), i.e., twenty different hidden output
sequences of length that are equal to the number of output dimensions in an LSTM
layer. As reported in Table 3.1, we have 1,104 UPEs and 1,557 benign users in our
dataset.
Experiment1: Using first 20 user-edits. In our first experiment, we used two
of our approaches, LSTM1 (Section 5.1.4) and LSTM2 (Section 5.1.5) to investigate
capabilities and performance of our proposed models in detecting Undisclosed Paid
Editors.

Results are reported in Table 5.1 that show our approaches achieving

AUROC scores of 0.926 and 0.901 for LSTM1 and LSTM2, respectively. Similarly,
the average precision for LSTM1 and LSTM2 is 0.897 and 0.845, respectively. When
comparing our approaches individually, the results also show that LSTM1 performed
better than LSTM2 both in terms of AUROC and average precision scores.
Comparison with related work. In order to evaluate experimental results
based on our LSTM1 and LSTM2 approaches, we once again considered work by Yamak et al. [30] and Zheng et al. [33] (SAFE) discussed in Section 2. Even though SAFE
makes baseline comparisons with Support Vector Machine (SVM), Cox proportional
hazard (CPH) model and Multi-source LSTM (M-LSTM) described in Section 2, we
limit comparison of our experimental results with only the best performing approach
in work by Zheng et al. [33], i.e., SAFE. We also compared our experimental results
from LSTM1 and LSTM2 with those using ORES scores, discussed in Section 2. As
we can see from Table 5.1, our LSTM1 and LSTM2 approaches to detect Undisclosed
Paid Editors has a comparable AUROC score but achieves a better average precision
(+0.031) than those based on Yamak et al.’s [30] approach. The table also shows
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that our LSTM1 and LSTM2 approaches achieve far better AUROC scores and
average precision when compared with the same using ORES scores as features. And
finally, AUROC scores and average precision from both of our approaches (LSTM1
and LSTM2) easily outperform corresponding scores using an approach based on the
SAFE. Figure 5.7 shows a comparison of AUROC and average precision using the
first 20 user-edits.
Table 5.1: Performance of our user-based features to detect undisclosed paid editors
and comparison with related work according to AUROC and average precision.
AUROC

Average Precision

LSTM1

0.926

0.897

LSTM2

0.901

0.845

Yamak et al. [30]

0.914

0.866

ORES

0.724

0.632

SAFE [33]

0.575

0.525

Figure 5.7: AUROC and average precision comparison using first 20 user-edits
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Experiment2: Using first K user-edits. In our second experiment, we again
use two of our approaches, LSTM1 (Section 5.1.4) and LSTM2 (Section 5.1.5), in
order to investigate capabilities and performance of our proposed models in detecting
Undisclosed Paid Editors using first K user-edits for each user in our dataset where
K ranges from 1 to 10. Results are reported in Table 5.2 that shows our approaches
achieving AUROC scores of 0.877 and 0.896 for LSTM1 and LSTM2 respectively
when up to 10 user-edits are considered. The table also shows average precision of
0.830 and 0.819 for LSTM1 and LSTM2 respectively.
Comparison with related work. Once again, we considered work by Yamak et
al. [30] and the SAFE approach by Zheng et al. [33] discussed in Sections 2, and
experimental results from our approach using ORES scores, discussed in Section 2, as
features in order to evaluate our experimental results. As we can see from Table 5.2,
our approaches (LSTM1 and LSTM2) to early detect Undisclosed Paid Editors easily
outperform both AUROC and average precision scores using approaches based on the
study by Yamak et al. [30], SAFE, and scores based on experimental results based on
ORES scores as features using as little as two edits. Figure 5.8 and 5.9 give visual
demonstration of superior performances of our model as compared to the those based
on related works. When our approaches are compared individually, the results also
show that LSTM2 performed better than LSTM1 when we consider first K edits.
Overall, our experimental results show that the LSTM2 is the best approach in the
early detection of undisclosed paid editors in terms of both AUROC and average
precision scores.
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of approaches using AUROC

Figure 5.9: Comparison of approaches using average precision.
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Table 5.2: Early detection performance of our user-based features to detect undisclosed paid editors and comparison with related work according to AUROC and
average precision.
K

1

2

3

4

5

5.3.1

Approach

AUROC

Average Precision

Approach

AUROC

Average Precision

LSTM1

0.642

0.472

K

LSTM1

0.785

0.627

LSTM2

0.641

0.458

LSTM2

0.860

0.777

ORES

0.610

0.460

ORES

0.657

0.529

Yamak [30]

0.521

0.368

Yamak [30]

0.769

0.712

SAFE [33]

0.692

0.645

SAFE [33]

0.583

0.533

LSTM1

0.667

0.477

LSTM1

0.813

0.687

LSTM2

0.739

0.601

LSTM2

0.874

0.789

6

ORES

0.636

0.500

ORES

0.655

0.533

Yamak [30]

0.635

0.444

7

Yamak [30]

0.789

0.729

SAFE [33]

0.616

0.570

SAFE [33]

0.580

0.531

LSTM1

0.679

0.488

LSTM1

0.842

0.749

LSTM2

0.801

0.663

LSTM2

0.885

0.805

ORES

0.651

0.515

ORES

0.668

0.548

Yamak [30]

0.688

0.519

Yamak [30]

0.798

0.731

SAFE [33]

0.607

0.553

SAFE [33]

0.579

0.530

LSTM1

0.709

0.526

LSTM1

0.864

0.799

LSTM2

0.827

0.712

LSTM2

0.892

0.817

ORES

0.642

0.505

ORES

0.670

0.552

Yamak [30]

0.706

0.588

Yamak [30]

0.815

0.746

SAFE [33]

0.598

0.543

SAFE [33]

0.579

0.530

LSTM1

0.754

0.573

LSTM1

0.877

0.830

LSTM2

0.842

0.745

LSTM2

0.896

0.819

ORES

0.644

0.513

ORES

0.672

0.558

Yamak [30]

0.751

0.680

Yamak [30]

0.827

0.759

SAFE [33]

0.589

0.536

SAFE [33]

0.578

0.529

8

9

10

Early Detection of Vandal Users

In the previous section, we evaluated the experimental results based on our approaches
(LSTM1 and LSTM2) to demonstrate its superiority in early detecting Undisclosed
Paid Editors compared to results from approaches based on related work. However,
we also evaluated the performance of our approaches when tested on a similar task
of early detecting Wikipedia vandal editors and, once again, made a comparison
of results from approaches based on related work. For that, we used the UMD-
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Wikipedia [16] dataset, collected for the task of detecting Wikipedia vandal editors.
The dataset consists of 17,027 users that were blocked by Wikipedia for vandalism and
16,549 randomly selected benign users collected between January 01, 2013, and July
31, 2014. The dataset also consists of edit meta-data comprised of user, page-type
(normal or meta-page), title of page edited, time of edit, and category for the total
of 770,040 edits out of which 160,651 edits were made by vandals, and 609,389 were
made by benign users. The dataset provides edit sequences for each user based on
characteristics of consecutive edits actions, such as speed, frequency, page-type, etc.,
that are encoded with unique string representation with a maximum sequence length
of 500 edits for the total of 33,576 users. For our experimental setup, we considered
edit sequences with up to 20 (inclusive) edits. As the UMDWikipedia [16] dataset is
balanced, we were also included an accuracy metric, along with AUROC and average
precision metrics, in comparing our results.
Experiment3: Using first 20 user-edits. First, we used two of our approaches,
LSTM1 (Section 5.1.4) and LSTM2 (Section 5.1.5), in order to investigate capabilities and performance of our proposed models in detecting Wikipedia vandal users
using UMDWikipedia [16] dataset. Results are reported in Table 5.3 that shows our
approaches achieving AUROC scores of 0.951 and 0.955, average precision of 0.969
and 0.972, and accuracy scores of 0.880 and 0.889 for LSTM1 and LSTM2 respectively.
Comparison with related work In order to evaluate experimental results based
on our LSTM1 and LSTM2 approaches, once again, we considered the SAFE approach
by Zheng et al. [33] (discussed in Section 2) using the UMDWikipedia [16] dataset.
As we can see from Table 5.3, LSTM1 achieved an AUROC score of 0.951, i.e. +0.376,
average precision of 0.969, i.e., +0.444, and accuracy score of 0.880, i.e. +0.240, as
compared to corresponding metrics based on the SAFE approach. Similarly, LSTM2
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achieved an AUROC score of 0.955, i.e. +0.380, average precision of 0.972, i.e.
+0.447, and accuracy score of 0.889, i.e. +0.249, as compared to corresponding
metrics based on the approach by SAFE [33]. The results show that LSTM2 was
the best performing approach. Both LSTM1 and LSTM2 are comparable to one
another and perform far better than SAFE [33]. Figure 5.10 shows a comparison of
our approaches with related work according to AUROC and average precision.
Table 5.3: Performance of our user-based features to detect undisclosed paid editors
and comparison with related work according to AUROC, average precision, and
accuracy
AUROC

Average Precision

Accuracy

LSTM1

0.951

0.969

0.880

LSTM2

0.955

0.972

0.889

SAFE [33]

0.575

0.525

0.640

Figure 5.10: Comparison of approaches using AUROC, average precision, and accuracy on UMDWikipedia [16]
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Experiment4: Using first K user-edits. Finally, we used two of our approaches, LSTM1 (Section 5.1.4) and LSTM2 (Section 5.1.5), in order to investigate
capabilities and performance of our proposed models in early detection of Wikipedia
vandal users using the UMDWikipedia [16] dataset. Results are reported in Table 5.4
that shows our approaches achieving AUROC scores of 0.948 and 0.952 for LSTM1
and LSTM2 respectively, when the first up to ten user-edits are considered. The table
also shows an average precision of 0.891 and 0.935 and accuracy scores of 0.878 and
0.886 for LSTM1 and LSTM2, respectively. When we compare our two approaches, we
can see that the LSTM2 performed slightly better than LSTM1. In terms of evaluation
metrics improvement with LSTM2, compared to those with LSTM1, accuracy score
achieved the biggest improvement while average precision score achieved the smallest
improvement.
Comparison with related work. Once again, we considered SAFE [33], discussed
in Section 2, to evaluate our approaches using the UMDWikipedia [16]. As we can
see from Table 5.4, our two approaches to detect Undisclosed Paid Editors, LSTM1
and LSTM2, easily outperform the results from experiments using an approach based
on study by SAFE [33] in all three metrics (AUROC, average precision, and accuracy
scores) using as little as two edits. Figures 5.11 through 5.13 shows the obvious
superiority of our approaches highlighting the fact that LSTM1 and LSTM2 curves
for all three metrics are significantly above those based on the approach by Zheng et
al. [33].
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Table 5.4: Early detection performance of our user-based features to detect Wikipedia
vandal editors and comparison with related work according to AUROC and average
precision.
K

1

2

3

4

5

Approach

AUROC

Average Precision

Accuracy

LSTM1

0.796

0.579

0.579

LSTM2

0.795

0.759

0.768

SAFE

0.692

0.645

0.661

LSTM1

0.859

0.776

0.807

LSTM2

0.886

0.842

0.845

K

6

7

Approach

AUROC

Average Precision

Accuracy

LSTM1

0.939

0.878

0.873

LSTM2

0.944

0.922

0.880

SAFE

0.583

0.533

0.651

LSTM1

0.944

0.883

0.874

LSTM2

0.948

0.927

0.883

SAFE

0.616

0.570

0.675

SAFE

0.580

0.531

0.651

LSTM1

0.899

0.834

0.850

LSTM1

0.946

0.886

0.876

LSTM2

0.911

0.877

0.862

LSTM2

0.950

0.929

0.884

SAFE

0.607

0.553

0.667

SAFE

0.579

0.530

0.651

LSTM1

0.920

0.856

0.862

LSTM1

0.947

0.889

0.877

LSTM2

0.929

0.899

0.871

LSTM2

0.951

0.934

0.886

SAFE

0.598

0.543

0.661

SAFE

0.579

0.530

0.651

LSTM1

0.930

0.871

0.870

LSTM2

0.938

0.914

0.878

SAFE

0.589

0.536

0.661

8

9

10

LSTM1

0.948

0.891

0.878

LSTM2

0.952

0.935

0.886

SAFE

0.578

0.529

0.651

Figure 5.11: Comparison of approaches using AUROC.
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Figure 5.12: Comparison of approaches using average precision.

Figure 5.13: Comparison of approaches using Accuracy.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

6.1

What have we done so far?

In this thesis, we addressed the problem of identifying undisclosed paid articles and
editors in English Wikipedia. Our proposed approach relies on article-based and
user-based features that describe potential malicious behavior. Through evaluation
of our approaches, we demonstrated the following:
• We showed that we can detect undisclosed paid articles with an AUROC of 0.98
and an average precision of 0.91. As our features are independent of linguistic
barriers, our proposed approach can work on any Wikipedia language version.
• Through our article network analysis, we highlighted the complexity in investigation of editing behavior of sockpuppet groups. We showed that undisclosed
paid editors contribute to a limited number of Wikipedia titles, possibly focused
on promotional articles, and the number of editors contributing to such articles
can vary from one undisclosed paid editors groups (sockpuppets) to another.
• We showed that our user-based features can be used to identify undisclosed paid
editors with 0.93 AUROC and 0.90 average precision. Our results in detecting
undisclosed paid articles and editors improve over state-of-the-art approaches.

51
• We showed that our proposed LSTM models are well capable of early-detecting
undisclosed paid editors with an AUROC of 0.88 and .90 and average precision of
0.83 and 0.82 respectively for LSTM1 and LSTM2. Furthermore, we also showed
that our LSTM approaches are well capable of early-detecting undisclosed paid
editors with our LSTM2 approach outperforming performance based on the
related works using as little as two edits.
• We demonstrated the reliability of our LSTM approaches in addressing other
similar tasks such as early detection of vandals in Wikipedia using the UMDWikipedia [16] dataset set up to study the problem of detecting vandals in
Wikipedia. We showed that our proposed LSTM approaches can be used to
identify vandals with up to 0.96 AUROC and 0.97 average precision using our
best performing approach (LSTM2) far surpassing the performance of a similar
approach by SAFE [33].

6.2

Future directions

Our proposed approaches can be further improved and extended in the future. Wikipedia
has shown significant interest in our published work with the possibility of deployment
of our system directly into their platform. For that reason, we are now collaborating
with one of the teams from Wikipedia that will provide us with access to additional
user edit history data. With these additional data, we can improve our working
dataset to further improve the model-training and its performance in detecting undisclosed paid editors. Our approaches can also be extended in the future for the study
of sockpuppets in general. In the future, it is also possible to include content analysis
of Wikipedia edits and investigate the socio-behavioral aspect of editors. One such
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aspect that Wikipedia is interested in investigating is the study of user interactions to
detect detrimental behavior such as harassment. Finally, our thesis work can also be
extended beyond the study of early detection of undisclosed paid editors to address
the problem of early detection of sockpuppets in general.
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APPENDIX A

REPRODUCING EXPERIMENTS

A.1

Getting the code

The code can be downloaded from GitHub [7] using the URL below. The repository
will be made public after publication of this thesis. However, dataset will not be
available given the restricted nature of our dataset provided to us by Wikipedia.
URL: https://github.com/nikeshjoshi/DetectingUPEinWikipedia.git
We used Jupyter Notebook to implement our thesis work.

A.2

Repository Structure

The repository is structured in same was as the directory structure used in running
all of our experiments as shown below:
1. ./graphOutput/ stores graph output
2. ./nbDetectUPArticles/ includes notebooks required for detection of undisclosed
paid articles experiment
3. ./nbEarlyDetectUPEditors/ includes notebooks required for early detection of
undisclosed paid editors experiments
4. ./nbRetrieveORES/ includes notebooks required to retrieve ORES scores
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5. ./nbSAFE/ includes notebook required for baseline experiment using SAFE
6. ./nbThesisResults/ includes notebooks to run all the early detection of undisclosed paid editors experiments using single notebook and tabulate and plot all
the experimental results together
7. ./pickles/ stores pickle output
8. ./plots/ stores plot outputs
9. ./wikiData/ includes data files provided by Wikipedia administrator. Note:
Two files in this folder have been added as zip file because of GitHub size limit.
To re-run the experiments, those files must be unzipped.
10. ./vewsData/ includes data files used by Kumar et al. [17] that we use for baseline
comparison

A.3

Getting the data

Additional data files that exceed size limit on GitHub repository are privately stored
on google drive and will not be publicly available given the restricted nature of our
dataset provided to us by Wikipedia. Authorized users can access these data using
google drive link (Additional Data Link).
To re-run the experiments, these data folders must be placed in same directory
that contains other folders listed in Section A.2.

A.4

Pre-processing of data

Wikipedia provided us their data in three different pairs of data files in binary form.
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• Content data
– positive content (inc short)
– negative content
• User registration data
– positive user registration
– negative user registration
• Edit history (contribution) data
– positive contrib full v2
– negative contrib full v2
Beside these data files that were provided by Wikipedia, we also generate secondary
data files that are used in our notebooks that run our experiments.
• positive content with ORES.csv
• negative content with ORES.csv
• content data with ORES.csv
• user data without ORES.csv
• graph.pkl
• user and content data with ORES.csv
• posAll Data ORES Scores.csv
• negAll Data ORES Scores.csv
• userEdits.csv
Due to the restricted nature of Wikipedia dataset, these data will not be publicly
available from GitHub [7] repository.
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A.5

Running the experiments

In this section, we discuss procedures for running our all of our experiments including
the ones for Detection of Undisclosed Paid Articles and Early Detection of Undisclosed
Paid Editors.

A.5.1

Detection of Undisclosed Paid Articles

Follow hierarchical procedure can be followed for complete re-run of experiments for
detection of undisclosed paid articles by running Jupyter notebooks in order as listed
below. Figure A.1 shows procedural flow diagram for detection of undisclosed paid
articles.
1. RetrieveORESScores AllContents.ipynb - Retrieve ORES scores for each articles
in Wikipedia content data.
• Outputs:
(a) positive content with ORES.csv
(b) negative content with ORES.csv
2. dupa ParseContentData.ipynb - Parse content data.
• Outputs:
(a) content data with ORES.csv
3. dupa ParseUserData.ipynb - Parse user data.
• Outputs:
(a) user data without ORES.csv
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4. dupa Generate Graph.ipynb - Generate article-article network graph (where Wikipedia
articles are nodes, and there is an edge between two articles if the same user
has edited them) to extract article PageRank and Local Clustering Coefficient
(LCC).

• Outputs:

(a) graph.pkl

5. dupa runme.ipynb - Merge content data with user data.

• Outputs:

(a) user and content data with ORES.csv

6. dupa DetectUndisclosedPaidArticles.ipynb - Train and test model.

• This notebook generates experiment results for detection of undisclosed
paid articles. We can also directly rerun this notebook using pre-existing
user and content data with ORES.csv and graph.pkl files to reproduce experiment results.
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Figure A.1: Detection of Undisclosed Paid Articles Process.

A.5.2

Early Detection of Undisclosed Paid Editors

Follow hierarchical procedure can be followed for complete re-run of experiments for
detection of undisclosed paid articles by running Jupyter notebooks in order as listed
below. Figure A.2 shows procedural flow diagram for detection of undisclosed paid
articles.
1. RetrieveORESScores AllEdits.ipynb - Retrieve ORES scores for each edits in
Wikipedia contribution data.
• Outputs:
(a) posAll Data ORES Scores.csv
(b) negAll Data ORES Scores.csv
2. ParseUserData.ipynb - Parse user edit data.
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• Outputs:
(a) userEdits.csv
3. These notebooks generate experiment results for early detection of undisclosed
paid editors with corresponding approach and dataset. Run following notebooks
(order not important):
(a) lstm1 max20 overall and firstKedits.ipynb - Run experiment using LSTM1
(discussed in Section 5.1.4).
(b) lstm2 max20 overall and firstKedits.ipynb - Run experiment using LSTM2
(discussed in Section 5.1.5).
(c) Yamak max20 overall and firstKedits.ipynb - Run experiment using Yamak et al. [30] approach.
(d) vewsData lstm1 max20 overall and firstKedits.ipynb - Run experiment using LSTM1 (discussed in Section 5.1.4) approach with UMDWikipedia [16]
dataset.
(e) vewsData lstm2 max20 overall and firstKedits.ipynb - Run experiment using LSTM2 (discussed in Section 5.1.5) approach with UMDWikipedia [16]
dataset.
(f) safe max20 overall and firstKedits.ipynb - Run experiment using SAFE [33]
approach.
4. Alternative method:
(a) earlyDetectUPE runAll.ipynb - Run all early detection of undisclosed paid
editors experiments.
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5. Generate results and plots:
(a) earlyDetectUPE Plots and Tables only.ipynb - Once all early detection of
undisclosed paid editors experiments have been executed, this notebook
tabulates all the results and plots together.

Figure A.2: Early Detection of Undisclosed Paid Editors Process.

